On Monday, 2 June, having assessed the results of the examination carried out by a senator authorised by the President of the Supreme Court, the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court decided that none of the grounds for dismissal of the Prosecutor General provided for in Section 411 of the Office of the Prosecutor Law could be established. 29 of the 30 senators who were present voted in favour of this decision.

The examination of a whistleblower's report did not reveal that the Prosecutor General Juris Stukāns had attempted to coerce a supervising prosecutor in criminal proceedings to take actions contrary to her beliefs. The Prosecutor General's Office has held its usual working meetings to discuss complex legal issues in the particular criminal proceedings. The fact that the purpose of the meetings referred to in the report was to discuss criminal law issues with colleagues in a professional manner and not to psychologically coerce the whistleblower into taking actions in criminal proceedings contrary to her convictions has been confirmed not only by the persons interrogated, but also by the format of the meetings. Not only the Prosecutor General and the whistleblower, but also other criminal justice professionals were invited to and participated in the meetings. The meetings were characterised by lively discussions. All participants confirmed that the discussions were on professional issues related to the case. Deliberations and discussions are a normal part of the work of the Prosecutor's Office and disagreements on the interpretation of legal issues are part of the everyday life of a lawyer.

No giving of instructions within the meaning of Section 6(4) of the Office of the Prosecutor Law was established. The Prosecutor's Office is a hierarchical institution – this is stipulated by law. The Prosecutor General has a number of legal mechanisms to influence the work of the Prosecutor's Office, including giving instructions to lower-ranking prosecutors. Instructions must not be arbitrary – they must not be contrary to the law or based on apparent misinterpretation. If a prosecutor is in doubt as to whether an instruction is lawful, he or she may ask for it to be put in writing. This was not done.

No personal threats were found, including threats to the prosecutor's career or well-being, threats of disciplinary liability, or bossing. There were no proposals to manipulate the case, the circumstances of the case, the evidence, or the personal motives of the Prosecutor General as to the outcome of the case.

Two phrases that could be perceived as a personal insult were uttered during the discussions. However, given the content of the discussions, this does not rise to the level of systematic and persistent humiliation or coercion of a person. Participants also pointed out that the use of abusive language, an attacking style and a lack of empathy towards the opponent are ways in which the Prosecutor General often communicates with his subordinates. Consequently, this particular case cannot be regarded as psychological terror against the person concerned.

In the present case, one can speak of collegial ethics, but the phrases uttered do not in themselves rise to the level which, given the high degree of protection of the office of Prosecutor-General, would justify the dismissal of the Prosecutor-General from his post.

The President of the Supreme Court initiated the review of the Prosecutor General's alleged breaches of the law after receiving a whistleblower's report and assessing the circumstances set out therein in accordance with the Whistleblowing Law. The President of the Supreme Court concluded that the allegations contained in the report of the supervising prosecutor receiving instructions in criminal proceedings contrary to her belief were partially confirmed and that a violation was possible in the given circumstances, and therefore, in accordance with Section 413 of the Office of the Prosecutor Law, initiated an investigation, authorizing Senator Aija Branta to conduct it. The Parliament may dismiss the Prosecutor General if a Supreme Court judge, specially authorised by the President of the Supreme Court, has established one of the grounds for dismissal referred to in Article 411 of this Law and the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court has issued an opinion thereon.

 

Information prepared by

Rasma Zvejniece, Head of the Division of Communication of the Supreme Court

E-mail: rasma.zvejniece@at.gov.lv, telephone: +371 67020396, +371 28652211